Nuclear Deviance by Michal Smetana

Author:Michal Smetana
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783030242251
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Whereas the Obama administration explicitly reaffirmed the validity of the three pillars (Kerry 2015), it nevertheless also implicitly acknowledged the hierarchical link between nonproliferation and peaceful use, making the former superordinate in relation to the latter (cf. Müller 2017, p. 5; Kuppuswamy 2006, p. 144).

There seemed to be a consensus in the NPT regime about the affirmation of the IAEA’s role as an institution of social control and the implementation of the monitoring and verification practices in Iranian case (cf. Ogilvie-White 2007, p. 457; S/RES/2231 2015; NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p. 3). Nevertheless, the use of economic sanctions as a legitimate rule-enforcing instrument has been contested throughout the crisis, primarily by the NAM countries. Both the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the Draft Final Document in 2015 stressed that “responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations” (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p. 3; United Nations 2015, p. 2). Both these Review Conferences also reaffirmed the role of the UNSC and UNGA in dealing with cases of non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards (NPT/CONF.2010/50 2010b, p. 3; United Nations 2015, p. 2).

As a high-profile deviant event, the Iranian nuclear crisis also opened a window of opportunity for relevant stakeholders to actively modify the rules or promote new initiatives within the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Indeed, at both the 2005 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, several states, particularly the United States and its NATO allies, proposed new measures to strengthen the nonproliferation norm—the new “gold standards” (Dhanapala 2010, p. 2). Many of these proposals were rhetorically linked to the need to react to the “recent non-compliance issues,” or even explicitly to the Iranian case (or Iranian and North Korean cases) (cf. Jones 2010). The three most debated measures have been: first, the multilateralization of nuclear fuel cycle, in the form of an international fuel bank, which would guarantee the external supply of reactor fuel and therefore promote the standard that NNWS would forgo their domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities (cf. ElBaradei 2005; IAEA 2005b; Yudin 2009; Rauf and Simpson 2004); second, promotion of the (so far voluntary) Additional Protocol as a new verification standard in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and possibly a precondition for new supply arrangements (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43 2008, para.38; cf. NPT/CONF.2005/WP.10 2005; ElBaradei 2005; Asada 2011); third, the clarification of the rules of withdrawal from the NPT under Article X, specifying the conditions for withdrawal, the overall procedure, as well as the role of the UNSC in the withdrawal process (cf. NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32 2005; NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16 2005; NPT/CONF.2005/WP.59 2005; ElBaradei 2005, p. 5; Ford 2008).

However, a large number of countries, primarily the NAM states, strongly resisted adoption of any binding language on these measures. The NAM position, continuously reaffirmed at various nonproliferation fora, has been “that it is fundamental to make the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures” (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19 2005), and that the decision to

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